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Experience or Reason: The Tort Theories
of Holmes and Doe
lohn Phillip Reid*
Oliver Wendell Holmes is credited with awakening the American bar
to the utility of tort theory. The author here emphasizes the contribu-

tions to tort theory made by a Chief Justice of the New Hampshire

Supreme Court, Charles Cogswell Doe, during the latter half of the
nineteenth century and compares and contrasts the tort theories of
Holmes and Doe through analysis of the judicial opinions and other
writings of each man.

"The theory of Torts," Edwin A. Jaggard wrote during the closing
decade of the nineteenth century, "was essentially terra incognita until
the contributions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., appeared on the
subject."' History supports this view. The first American treatise on
torts, written by Francis Hillard, had been published in 1859.2 Yet, for
a good many years thereafter, the very idea of such a book was "a
matter of ridicule."3 In 1871 Holmes himself suggested that torts
might not be "a proper subject for a law book"; that it had not yet
arrived at the stage where anyone but a self-sacrificing" writer could
treat it as "an integral part of a commentary on the entire body of
the law."4 Just eight years later, Thomas M. Cooley, perhaps fearful
the profession might not understand the meaning of the word, was
careful to give his volume on torts an alternative title, calling it, A
Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent
of Contracts.5 By 1895 all had changed. In that year Jaggard was able
to quote Sir Frederick Pollock to the effect that "there is really a law
of Torts, not merely a number of rules about various kinds of Torts,that there is a true, living branch of the common law, and not a
collection of heterogeneous instances." 6
The dates are significant; not only in the history of torts but also
in the general history of American law. They span the judicial career
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University. The author eztends his appreciation to the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation for supporting this research and
to his colleague, Professor Edward J. Bloustein, who contributed valuable insight
during preparation of this article.
1. I JAGGARD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS vi (1895).
HImLARD, Tm LAw OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRPNCS (1859).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I JAcGARU, op. cit. supra note 1, at vi.
Holmes, Book Notice, 5 Am. L. REv. 340, 341 (1871).
See discussion, PnossEn, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW
I JAGGARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at vi.

OF TORTS

ix (1953).
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of Charles Cogswell Doe who was appointed to the New Hampshire
Supreme Judicial Court in 1859, the year Hillard's treatise was published. He died while serving as Chief Justice of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, just five months after Jaggard quoted Pollock. Although none will gainsay the fact that credit for awakening the
American bar to the need for a theory of torts, and for developing
the main lines along which that theory has been formulated, belongs
to Oliver Wendell Holmes, it is time to recognize that others, such
as Judge Doe, were also working in the vineyard. While Holmes has
left his discoveries in the permanent and easily accessible form of
his classic book, The Common Law, the efforts of judges like Doe
remain buried in the most neglected area of American legal research,
the story of our state courts. Until that story is told the history of
the emergence of torts as a distinct and disciplined topic in AngloAmerican law will not be fully known.
By the 1870's, many scholars, both on and off the bench, recognized
the need for a theory. "The lack of general conceptions on this subject," Jaggard observed, "is apparent in the absence of any consistent
theory as to why a man is liable for his tort, although in contract and
in crime the reason for legal responsibility readily suggests itself to
any inquirer, and is to be found in any book on those subjects." 7 As
Holmes put it, "The law did not begin with a theory. It has never
worked one out."8 Judge Doe explained why.
Formerly, in England, there seems to have been no well-defined test of
an actionable tort. Defendants were often held liable "because," as Raymond
says, "he that is damaged ought to be recompensed"; and not because, upon
some clearly stated principle of law founded on actual culpability, public
policy, or natural justice, he was entitled to compensation from the defendant. The law was supposed to regard "the loss and damage of the party
suffering," more than the negligence and blameworthiness of the defendant:
but how much more it regarded the former than the latter, was a question
not settled, and very little investigated.

"The loss and damage of the

party suffering," if without relief, would be a hardship to him; relief
compulsorily furnished by the other party would often be a hardship to him:

When and why the "loss and damage" should, and when and why they
should not, be transferred from one to the other, by process of law, were

problems not solved in a philosophical manner. There were precedents,
established upon superficial, crude, and undigested notions; but no application of the general system of legal reason to this subject. 9

Although nineteenth-century legal thought placed stress on the
deterrent aspects of the law of torts, there is little in Judge Doe's
7. Ibid.
8. HOLMES, Thr CozimoN LAW 77 (1881).
9. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 444-45, 16 Am. Rep. 372, 375 (1873).

1965 ]

HOLMES AND DOE

writings which indicates (aside from his emphasis on fault) that he
considered that the prevention of socially-harmfful actions should be
a factor in formulating a theory of liability. For Doe, the essential
function of torts-which he saw largely in terms of negligence-was
to adjust loss resulting from damage caused either by or to another.
This is the basic problem which the legal order of a civilized society
must solve, yet well into the second half of the nineteenth century,
the Anglo-American common law lacked a theory to guide courts
when allocating the resources available for just settlement. Some
New England lawyers, mesmerized by the writ system, believed Chief
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts had answered all questions in the
famous case of Brown v. Kendall.10 Doe disagreed. He thought
Shaw's decision shed little light on the matter, and, properly viewed,
dealt only with questions of remedy and proof." Admittedly, what
Shaw had done was evolutionary. Up to his time the law of personal
liability had been divided between the actions of trespass and of
trespass on the case. Trespass, which was concerned with immediate
and direct injuries, had merely required proof of an immediate and
direct overt act. Case, on the other hand, required proof of negligence.
In Brown v. Kendall, an action of trespass, the defendant had injured
the plaintiff by accidentally striking him with a stick while trying to
separate two fighting dogs. The defendant had acted lawfully and
without intent to injure. The plaintiff had offered no evidence of
negligence. Shaw, superimposing upon "trespass" the traditional "case'
burden of proof, held that the plaintiff had failed to prove an actionable tort. The decision became the leading precedent for the
rule, that, to sustain liability, intent or negligence is necessary.
Brown v. Kendall may have satisfied the average lawyer as the last
word in tort liability, but not Holmes and Doe. What was needed,
according to Holmes, was "to discover whether there is any common
ground at the bottom of all liability in tort."2 The difficulty which
he and Doe encountered, and the factor explaining why a theory of
torts had not evolved at an earlier day, was inherent in a constituent
glossed over by Shaw-the historical integrity of the forms of actions.
What Shaw was not in a position to appreciate was that the concept
of tort liability had not yet acquired a generic significance. 1 3 Wrongs
still were considered as incidental to remedies and the law of personal
injury was looked upon as a system of forms rather than principles. 14
10. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
11. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 451, 16 Am. Rep. 372, 383 (1873).
12. HoLmEs, THE Com.soNr LAw 77 (1881).
13. ALOW, Tim GENrus OF LEMUEL SHAw 210 (1962).
14. See discussion in Preface to the First Edition in I Hmu.xAD, THE LAW OF TORTS
OR PRIVATE WRONGS vi-vii (2d ed. 1861). A careful reading of this Preface will show

that while Hillard recognized the problem, he did not solve it.
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The action in Kendall v. Brown was trespass and Shaw's decision became authority for ignoring the distinction between trespass and case
on matters of proof and on the question of culpability. But this was
all. The heritage of the writ system still remained. For centuries, as
Holmes said, "each of the recognized torts had its special history, its
own precedents, and no one dreamed, so far as I know, that the
different cases of liability were, or ought to be, governed by the same
principles throughout." 15 His biographer, Mark DeWolfe Howe, has
placed the problem in sharper perspective:
While the forms of action prevailed it was possible for lawyers, though
doubtless impossible for philosophers, to see structure in the English legal
system. The common-law practitioner saw no need for a theory of liability
in tort when he knew the scope of the action on the case and the reach
of an action of trespass....
The common law, in other words, had not felt
the need for a philosophical classification of its elements while it had a
procedural scaffolding from which the practitioner could pursue his disorderly calling.16

Accepting Howe's analysis, it becomes evident why Holmes and

Doe were among the first who sought to replace the old system with
a workable theory of liability. For it was during their own era that

"reformers pulled down the scaffolding" which had previously served
as an artificial substitute for philosophic order. 17 Indeed, it was Judge
Doe who, in New Hampshire at least, was primarily responsible for
casting aside the forms of action and who robbed the common law
of its procedure-based rationale. 8 If he felt need for new doctrine,
it was need he had largely created.
History must be cautious, however, when embracing generalities.
What Howe gives as Holmes's motivations only partially explain Doe's.
The fact is, that even without the revolution in pleading, the New
Hampshire jurist would have sought a theory of torts. This was because of Judge Doe's special jurisprudential interest in ridding the
law of the "fragmentary rules or disorganizing exceptions" which, he
thought, robbed legal science of its "reason" and its "ancient uniformity, consistency and symmetry." 19 Few things annoyed him more
than a legal formulae which courts treated as presumptions of law,
but which should be, and which Doe was sure once had been, ques15. COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 210, 223 (1920); Holmes, Law in Science and Science
in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 451 (1899).
16. HowE, JusTIcE OLvER WENDELL HOLmES: THE PROViNG YEAms 65-66 (1963).
17. Id. at 66.
18. Reid, From Common Sense to Common Law to Charles Doe: The Evolution
of Pleading in New Hampshire,1 N.H.B.J. 27 (No. 3 1959).
19. Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N.H. 186, 196, 205 (1886) (dissenting opinion).
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tions of fact.20 An illustration of this is the Mink Case,' in which the
defendant appealed a fine assessed against him for shooting minks
out of season. He claimed he shot the minks in self defense; to keep
them from killing his geese. The plaintiff, relying on analogies drawn
chiefly from English precedents, asked the court to rule that a threat
to property would have constituted a valid defense only if the geese
were unable to retreat from the area of danger. Judge Doe thought

this a ridiculous extension of an unreasonable law.
If the defendant's geese were bound to retreat before these vermin, it follows that horses, cattle, sheep, swine, and poultry are bound at common
law, to retreat and to be driven by their owners from their own land, if
retreat is possible, regardless of course or distance, before every dog that
chooses to attack them. .

.

. [Ajnd in many ways, the human industries

and liberties of the country are subject to interruptions, hindrances, and
restrictions not heretofore judicially established or practically acknowledged. 22

Judge Doe believed the rule requiring retreat could be traced to

the days when English courts advised the jury on the facts and
weight of evidence. Concerned with "spring guns," "man-traps," and

"other engines calculated to destroy human life," they had turned a
question of fact into a question of law, and, as time went on, had

forgotten that the correct test is whether violence, used to effect
defense, "was or was not commensurate with the danger, and, con-

sequently, that the violence was or was not reasonably necessary."23
It is reasonable that the kind and
measurably proportioned to the kind
consequences of using the force, and
it. The probable
consequences on
24
compared.

amount of defensive force should be
and amount of danger, to the apparent
the apparent consequences of not using
both sides are to be considered and

This was the general principle of which the English courts, in their

refinement of the law of defense, had lost sight. It was based upon
the reason of the law, and properly framed constituted a question of
pure fact.
It was for the jury to say, considering the defendant's valuable property in
the geese, the absence of absolute property in the minks, their character,
whether harmless or dangerous, the probability of their renewing their
pursuit if he had gone about his usual business and left the geese to their
20. Reid,- A Peculiar Mode of Expression: judge Doe's Use of the Distinction
Between Law and Fact, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 427.

21. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 16 Am. Rep. 339 (1873).
22. Id. at 371.
23. Id. at 347.
24. Id. at 348.
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fate, the sufficiency and practicability of other kinds of defence,-considering
all the material elements of the question, it was for the jury to say whether
the danger was so imminent as to make the defendant's shot reasonably
necessary in point of time. If, but for the shot, some of the geese . ..
apparently would have been killed by these minks within a period quite
indefinite,fand if other precautionary measures of a reasonable kind, as
measured by consequences, would have been ineffectual, the danger was
imminent enough
to justi y-the destruction of the minks for the protection
25
of property.

Doe's lesson in the Mink Case was that the law of torts must not
be based on rules and exceptions precast to cover each particular
situation. Rather, it should rest on a few general principles. The first
inquiry is whether the defendant had acted from reasonable necessity.
This was the broad test of lawfulness and, in the absence of a statute,
should always be a question of fact and not of law.) This would be
the only issue in a litigation (such as the Mink Case) in which liability is based on a statute. A finding that the defendant acted with
reasonable necessity is a finding that he is not liable. But in the
ordinary tort situation, when the complaint alleges accidental rather
than intentional or statutory injury, a finding that the defendant acted
with reasonable necessity raises a second issue. Did he act without
fault?
During 1873 Holmes completed the first major step in the study
which resulted in his memorable lectures on torts in The Common
Law when he published his article, "The Theory of Torts."2 Believing
the law's concern is not with the sins of men but with their actions,2 7
Holmes sought to disprove Austin's thesis that tort liability depends
on fault alone.2 8 Adopting an historical approach, Holmes suggested
"that the legal liabilities defined by a book of torts are divisible into
those in which culpability is an element and those in which it is not."2
For some reason, as yet unexplained, but which surely can be viewed
as demonstrating his interest in Holmes's emerging work, Doe received, while still in proofs, a copy of the article. It apparently made a
strong impression on him.3° He had no quarrel with the validity of
Holmes's history or with his main thesis. If he had any quarrel at all it
was one of emphasis. Since Doe did not share Holmes's strong reaction
to the Austinian concept of duty and its accompanying subjective
25. Id. at 346.
26. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REV. 652 (1873).
27. How, JusTIncE OLIVER WENDELL HOLmEs: TE PROVING YEAs 80 (1963).
28. I Ausmr, JursPRoUDENcE chs. 24, 25, 26 (3d ed.); see especially id. at 474,
484-85, 492, 504, 512.
29. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REv. 652, 659 (1873).
30. The manner in which he used it caused resentment on Holmes's part. See
Hown, op. cit. supra note 27, at 83-85; Reid, Brandy in his Water: Correspondence
Between Doe, Holmes and Wigmore, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 522, 529 (1962).
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standard of tort liability, 31 he also did not share his concern for the
need to show that liability without fault was well entrenched in
common law. While Judge Doe acknowledged the existence of nonfault liability for accident, he was far more interested in limiting than
in re-establishing it in the law of torts. In the very year Holmes's
2
article was published, Doe wrote his opinion in Brown v. Collins9
which became the leading American precedent restricting liability
to circumstances from which fault could be imputed.
The moment for doing so was opportune. Rylands v. Fletcher,3 the
chief judicial pronouncement with which Doe had to contend was
only five years old and still fresh in the minds of American lawyers.
To many, for whom the law of torts began with Shaw's opinion in
Brown v. Kendall, the thought that liability could rest on a non-culpable, accidental occurrence, seemed a radical departure. Doe knew
better, and made clear that he, like the English judges who had
decided Rylands, did not regard that case as establishing a novel proposition. 34 He took pains in recounting that the ancient law of England often based the plaintiff's right to compensation on the theory,
"he that is damaged ought to be recompensed," and not upon culpability.3 Doe doubted, however, the usefulness of early cases because,
by focusing upon the loss to the party suffering rather than upon
the intent of the party acting, they had not been founded on a
rationale consistent with nineteenth-century public policy. Indeed,
he felt it doubtful if they were based on any acceptable rationale,
since they had disregarded "whether, by transferring the hardship
to the other party, anything more will be done than substitute one
suffering party for another," and had not considered "what legal
reason can be given for relieving the party who has suffered by making
another suffer the expense of his relief."
Under the Rylands doctrine, a man is liable for damage caused by
things he has lawfully brought upon his land and which subsequently
escape. This rule, Doe believed, was "substantially an adoption of
the early authorities, and an extension of the ancient practice of
holding the defendant liable, in some cases, on the partial view that
regarded the misfortune of the plaintiff upon whom damage had
fallen, and required no legal reason for transferring the damage to
the defendant." 37 That Doe, himself, was guilty of extending the
31. HowE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 76-88. It is not known if Doe was familiar
with Austin.
32. Supra note 9.
33. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
34. 2 HAnPER & JA ms, ToRTs 792 (1956).
35. Brown v. Collins, supra note 9, at 445, 16 Am. Rep. at 375.
36. Id. at 446, 16 Am. Rep. at 376.
37. Id. at 447, 16 Am. Rep. at 378.
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holding of Rylands is seen from the fact that he agreed with Holmes
that it was based "on the principle that it is politic to make those who
go into extra-hazardous employments take the risk on their own
shoulders." 8 Rylands says nothing about "extra-hazardous activities"
and, in the Exchequer Chamber at least, it was probably not intended
to limit the doctrine to special, commercial situations.
To sustain his view of Rylands, Doe emphasized Mr. Justice Blackburn's decision; especially Blackburn's famous paragraph which began:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own
purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not
do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape. 39

"This," said Doe,
is going back a long way for a standard of legal rights, and adopting an
arbitrary test of responsibility that confounds all degrees of danger, pays
no heed to the essential elements of actual fault, puts a clog upon natural
and reasonably necessary uses of matter, and tends to embarrass and
obstruct much of the work which seems to be man's duty carefully to do.40

To be sure, Judge Doe did not dismiss Rylands merely because it

harked back to primitive notions unsupported by modem policy or
judicial reasoning. He acknowledged that the case rested on what
Blackburn thought an equitable principle. "[I]t seems but reasonable
and just," he quoted Blackburn as saying, "that the neighbour, who
has brought something on his own property which was not naturally
there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property,
but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's,
should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does
not succeed in confining it to his own property."41
Seeking an example sustaining this principle, Blackburn had cited

the rule that an owner of cattle "must keep them at his peril, or he
will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape." 42
Holmes pointed out that in many prairie states the rule did not
prevail,43 but to Judge Doe this was probably irrelevant. The economic
and physical characteristics of contemporary New Hampshire were
38. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REv. 652, 653 (1873); Brown v.
Collins, supranote 9, at 445, 16 Am. Rep. at 375.
39. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
40. Brown v. Collins, supra note 9, at 448, 16 Am. Rep. at 379.
41. Fletcher v. Rylands, supra note 39, at 279; Brown v. Collins, supra note 9, at
446, 16 Am. Rep. at 377.
42. Fletcher v. Rylands, supra note 39, at 280.
43. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REv. 652, 653 (1873).
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closer to those of England than mid-west America, and Doe seems
to have had no objection to Blackburn's example. At least he admitted
that at common law an owner "'was at his peril to keep his cattle
on his own close and to prevent them from escaping.""
What Doe did object to was Blackburn's attempt to distinguish

employments conducted at the landowners peril from other activities which involved risks common to nineteenth-century urban life.
For in effect Rylands, by singling out for special consequences certain
enterprises because of their particular danger, created an exception to
the general rule governing inevitable accidents. Blackburn admitted
that, when the activities are not particularly dangerous, fault has to

be proven. This, he said, is necessary or no man would dare live in
the crowded cities of modem society.
Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted
without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their
property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking
upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger; and persons
who, by the license of the owner, pass near the warehouses where goods are
being raised or lowered, certainly do so subject to the inevitable risk of
accident. In neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want
of care or skill occasioning the accident. ....45

If this is so, Doe asked, why make an exception of (as he called it) an
extra-hazardous employment? General principles, not special exceptions are the reason of the law. As justification for the Rylands exception the assumption of risk defense is not a very helpful rationale with

which to explain tort liability. It would, for example, be authority for
holding that a plaintiff, by locating an object near a street
took upon himself the risk of its being broken by an inevitable accident
carrying a traveler off the street. But such a doctrine would open more
questions, and more difficult ones, than it would settle. At what distance
from a highway would an objejct be near it? What part of London is not
near a street? And then, as the defendant had as good a right to be at
home with his horses as to be in the highway, why might not his neighbor,
by electing to live in an inhabited country, as well be held to take upon himself the risk of inevitable accident happening by reason of the country being
inhabited, as to assume a highway risk by living near a road? If neighborhood is the test, who are a man's neighbor's but the whole human race?
If a person, by remaining in England, is held to take upon himself one
class of the inevitable dangers of that country because he could avoid that
class by migrating to a region of solitude, why should he not, for a like
44. Morse v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 66 N.H. 148, 149 (1889), quoting Avery
v. Maxwell, 4 N.H. 36, 36-37 (1827).
45. Fletcher v. Rylands, supra note 39, at 286-87; Brown v. Collins, supra note 9, at
449, 16 Am. Rep. at 380.
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reason, also be held to expose himself voluntarily to other classes of the
inevitable dangers of that country? And where does this reasoning end?46

What rankled Doe was Blackburn's suggestion that civilized man
assumes risks ordinary and familiar in civilized society, but does not
assume risks for newer dangers which are products of that civilization
and upon which progress may depend.
If danger is adopted as a test, the fact of danger, controverted in each case,

will present a question for the jury, and expand the issue of tort or no tort,
into a question of reasonableness in a form much broader than has been
generally used; or courts will be left to devise tests of peril, under varying
influences of time and place that
may not immediately produce a uniform,
47
consistent, and permanent rule.

Here we see what most worried him. That under the Rylands
doctrine the law would eventually be fragmentized into almost as
many rules as there are precedents. To prevent this in New Hampshire law, and in American law if possible, Judge Doe wrote his decision in Brown v. Collins. The defendant had been driving along a
street in the town of Tilton when his horses, frightened by a passing
train, bolted, left the road, and damaged a stone post which stood
on the plaintiff's land. Not only was there no dispute as to what
had happened, but the action has all the earmarks of a test case. The
facts, according to the reporter, "were agreed upon for the purpose
of raising the question of the right of the plaintiff to recover in this
action." 48 Doe wanted to come to grips with Rylands and it seems
likely he persuaded counsel in this minor litigation to give him the
chance. "We take the case," he wrote, "as one where, without actual
fault in the defendant, his horses broke from his control, ran away
with him, went upon the plaintiffs land, and did damage there,
against the will, intent, and desire of the defendant."49 The issue
could not have been drawn more clearly. Can a defendant who acted
lawfully, be made to answer for damages resulting from an inevitable
accident not his fault?
Judge Doe's answer was no. His chief objection to the Rylands
concept of liability for accident was that it "pays no heed to the
essential elements of actual fault."50 As a result it was too sweeping,
for, logically applied, it forced the law to hold an owner of real
property liable for all damage resulting to a neighbor from anything
done on his own land, and made answerable those who, while
46. Id. at 449, 16 Am. Rep. at 380-81.
47. Id. at 446, 16 Am. Rep. at 376.

48. Brown v. Collins, supra note 9 (reporters note).

49. Id. at 443, 16 Am. Rep. at 372.
50. Id. at 448, 16 Am. Rep. at 379.
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improving their own land for their own benefit according to their own
best sdill and diligence, had not foreseen the injury which the improvement might produce and had unwittingly damaged their neighbors.51 To avoid this harsh result, Doe stated what he thought a better
ground for tort liability:
When a defendant erroneously supposed, without any fault of either party,
that he had a right to do what he did, and his act, done in the assertion
of his supposed right, turns out to have been an interference with the
plaintiff's property, he is generally held to have assumed the risk of maintaining the right which he asserted, and the responsibility of the natural
consequences of his voluntary act. But when there was no fault on his
part, and the damage was not caused by his voluntary and intended act; or
by an act of which he knew, or ought to have known, the damage would be
a necessary, probable, or natural consequence; or by an act which he knew,
or ought to have known, 52to be unlawful,-we understand the general rule
to be, that he is not liable.

This was Doe's answer to Rylands v. Fletcher. If an act which

accidentally produces harm was lawful and proper-that is, one both
reasonably necessary and which the defendant might perform by
the use of proper and safe means-and "if the plaintiff's injury was
caused by such an act done with due care and all proper precautions,
the defendant was not liable."53 Applying this rule to the facts in
Brown v. Collins, Doe concluded that the defendant was not liable
unless everyone is liable for all damage done by superior force overpowering
him, and using him or his property as an instrument of violence. The
defendant, being without fault, was as innocent as if the pole of his wagon
had been hurled on the plaintiff's land by a whirlwind, or he himself, by
a stronger man, had been thrown through the plaintiff's window5 4

This became Charles Doe's most famous judgment in the field of
torts. It has been called "the leading American case against the
English rule of absolute liability for damages done by things brought
on and escaping from the defendant's land."55 Some observers have
doubted Brown v. Collins can stand for this proposition. They feel
Doe made a questionable choice selecting it as an instrument to
attack Rylands. As Dean William Prosser points out, the fact pattern
had nothing to do with activities which are performed at the actor's
peril. Brown v. Collins, he said, was clearly a case "of customary,
natural uses, to which the English courts would certainly never have
51. Id. at 445-46, 16 Am. Rep. at 376.

52. Id. at 450, 16 Am. Rep. at 382.

53. Id. at 451, 16 Am. Rep. at 383.
54. ibid.
55. Note, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 513, 519-20 (1950).
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applied the [Rylands] rule."m
Prosser is undoubtedly correct. Far from involving a dangerous
enterprise, Brown v. Collins arose from use by a traveler of a public
highway. This was exactly the customary and natural employment
which Blackburn (when discussing assumption of risk as a defense
for inevitable accident) had singled out as not coming within the
Rylands exception. 57 But to disregard Brown v. Collins on this score
is to condemn Judge Doe merely for departing from the accepted
canons of opinion writing. If this is error, it is error which Doe frequently committed. He simply refused to be confined within the
narrow limits of specific facts. When he had something to say he
seized the first opportunity for saying it,58 as well he had to, for he
could not depend on the economy of little New Hampshire to produce
the precise case he needed. Had he restrained himself, many of his
greatest pronouncements would have remained unwritten,5 9 and
American jurisprudence would have been a good deal poorer. In New
Hampshire, at least, there was never any doubt that Brown v. Collins
60
was binding precedent on the Rylands doctrine.
Had Doe not gone beyond the facts-had he not broadened the
holding in Brown v. Collins-his decision would have been limited to
the proposition that lawful accident is not a ground for liability,6' more
or less what Shaw had held in Brown v. Kendall. Doe wanted to go
beyond this and get at the issue of culpability; to lay stress on the
positive, that is on the fact that the defendant had acted without
fault. By making Rylands v. Fletcher his whipping boy, Doe left no
room for doubt that in a tort action (even one which in earlier days
would have depended on the writ of trespass) the plea of inevitable
accident is not only admissible but the plaintiff must prove culpability.
Another criticism by Prosser is that Brown v. Collins misstated the
Rylands doctrine; an error Prosser finds especially disturbing since
Doe "was beyond all question one of the greatest . . . [American
judges]."62 He suggests that Doe, borrowing the term "liability without fault" from Holmes's article, invented the notion that Rylands
stood for that proposition, and by misinterpreting Rylands was better
63
able to reject it.
Doe did not do this. He recognized "liability without fault" as the
56. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 150.
57. See text accompanying note 45 supra.

58.
59.
60.
61.
TORTS

Reid, A New Light Dawns, 9 VLL. L. REv. 233 (1964).
Reid, Almost a Hobby, 49 VA. L. REV. 58 (1963).
Garland v. Towne, 55 N.H. 55 (1874).
This is how Pollock interprets Brown. PoL.Locx, A TnnAmsE oN THE LAW OF
164 (New Am. ed. 1894).

62. P1ossm%, op. cit. supra note 5, at 150.
63. Id. at 180.
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ancient common-law doctrine from which Blackburn drew his inspiration, but did not confuse it with Blackburn's rule that one who
introduces danger to a neighborhood is liable for accidental damage
resulting from that danger regardless of fault.6 4 As Dean Wigmore
himself concedes, Doe did not reject Blackburn's principle entirely
(although he undoubtedly did so with regards the facts both in
Brown v. Collins and Rylands v. Fletcher).65 What Doe sought to
do, as previously suggested,66 was to restrict to as few as possible the
67
situations governed by the exception.
A third criticism leveled by Dean Prosser is that Doe paid too much
heed to what Blackburn had said in Exchequer Chamber, and dismissed Lord Cairns's decision in the House of Lords "as a foolish
distinction made as to land in a state of nature."68 Cairns had emphasized "non-natural use" as the distinction upon which the Rylands
exception turned. A "non-natural use," he said, is a use "for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition
was not in or upon it."69 By "non-natural," Prosser suggests, Cairns
meant "the ordinary, normal, customary and common." 70 He seems
to feel Cairns offered his distinction between a "natural" and a "nonnatural" use as an alternative to Blackburn's holding. And since
Cairns spoke in the higher court, Prosser believes that "the basis of
the final decision in Rylands v. Fletcher was the unusual, abnormal
and inappropriate character of the defendant's [activity]." 1
Doe apparently would not have agreed. He seems to have assessed
the two opinions much as did Professor Bohlen; feeling they dealt,
not with different tests, but with different areas of consideration. Of
the two opinions Professor Bohlen writes: "that of Mr. Justice Blackburn deals solely with the prima facie liability of the defendant, while
that of Lord Cairns deals with the question as to how far acts, prima
facie actionable, may be justified because done by the defendant in
the cause of his use of his land for his own purpose." 72
Regardless of whether Bohlen or Prosser is correct, it seems clear
that Doe anticipated Bohlen and did not view Cairns's decision in the
House of Lords as formulating a test to supplant Blackburn's. "The
opinion of Mr. Justice Blackburn," Bohlen would write thirty-eight
64.
65.
66.
67.

See text accompanying note 47 supra.
See text accompanying note 44 supra.
See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-III, 7 HAnv. L. REv. 441,

455 n.3 (1894).
68. PaossEa op. cit. supra note 5, at 150.
69. Rylands v. Fletcher, supranote 33.

70. Pnossxa. op. cit. supra note 5, at 141.
71. Id. at 142.
72. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, Part I, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298, 302
(1911).
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years after Brown v. Collins, "deals purely with a question of law.
The opinion of Lord Cairns deals with the question of social and
economic expedience."7 3 In Brown v. Collins Doe took much the
same approach. When criticizing the legal doctrine in Rylands he
concentrated upon Blackburn's opinion. When criticizing its social
and economic implications, he concentrated on Cairns's. Far from
dismissing Cairns's "natural" and "non-natural" use "as a foolish
distinction," Judge Doe gave it serious consideration; so serious, in
fact, that Professor Jeremiah Smith would later say that his criticisms
have "never been satisfactorily answered." 74 As Doe pointed out, to
make the Rylands exception to the law of inevitable accident turn
upon whether the activity involved a natural or non-natural use of
the land, would impede progress by penalizing acts of commerce
conducted in a lawful, skillful, and careful manner.
The distinction made by LORD CAIRNS between a natural and a nonnatural use of land, if he meant any thing more than the difference between
a reasonable use and an unreasonable one, is not established in the law.
Even if the arbitrary test were applied only to things which a man brings on
his land, it would still recognize the peculiar rights of savage life in a

wilderness, ignore the rights growing out of a civilized state of society, and
make a distinction not warranted by the enlightened spirit of the common
law: it would impose a penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable, skdllful,
and careful manner, to rise above a condition of barbarism. It is impossible
that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress
and improvement.75
How serious an obstacle would Rylands be with Cairns's test attached? Very serious indeed, Doe thought, since any principle which
makes a man liable for the natural consequences of "non-natural"
things escaping from his land, cannot be limited to those things alone.
"[I]t must be applied to all his acts that disturb the original order of
creation; or, at least, to all things which he undertakes to process or
control anywhere, and which were not used and enjoyed in what is
called the natural or primitive condition of mankind, whatever that
may have been."7" Here was where the concept of absolute liability
entered the picture; when the Rylands doctrine was extended to situations beyond the specific fact pattern of that case. Not to extend it,
to limit it to reservoirs of the type in Rylands v. Fletcher, would be
to fragmentize the law by creating special rules for special activities.
To extend it to all "non-natural" uses, in line with the Cairns test,
73. Id. at 303.
74. Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification-Ill, 30
H v. L. REv. 409, 411 n.7 (1917).
75. Brown v. Collins, supranote 9, at 448, 16 Am. Rep. at 379.
76. ibid.
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would place a crushing load on manufacturers and industrialists, few
of whom would be making "natural" use of their property, yet all of
whom might be acting both lawfully and carefully.
A great deal has been written concerning the economic and social
reasons which Judge Doe gave for rejecting Lord Cairns's "nonnatural" rule. It seems safe to say that most observers have treated

them as the heart of his decision. 77 The influences and forces which

motivated him to decide Brown v. Collins in the manner which he did

have been debated by those who credit and those who doubt the
economic interpretation of the development of torts.18 The favorite
hypothesis has been that Doe developed the distinction between
liability imposed for accidents regardless of fault and liability imposed
only where there is failure to use reasonable care or skill, in order to

make this distinction the ounce of legal difference by which courts
sanctioned the social objectives of industrial development.
This distorts the meaning and value of Brown v. Collins. That case
was written by a man in search of a theory of torts useful to the

lawyers and courts of his state. The social and economic arguments
which he used were important, true enough, but were primarily de-

signed to refute the "non-natural" test proposed by Lord Cairns; a
test based on social and economic arguments. Anyone familiar with
the jurisprudence of Charles Doe would not hesitate to say that the
true heart of Brown v. Collins is to be found in the legal arguments
79
which Doe directed against the holding by Mr. Justice Blackburn.
77. E.g.,

BoniaN, SrTmms in =a LAw OF TORTS 352 (1926).
78. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HAv. L. REV.
365, 383 (1940). Dean Pound suggests that Professor Boblen erred when explaining
Blackburn's decision in terms of England's dominant class (the landed gentry) unsympathetic towards industry, and Doe's decision in terms of New England's
dependence on cotton mills. Pound points out that Blackburn came to the bench
from a commercial practice, while Doe was the one associated with the gentry and
pastoral land, spending his life on his ancestral acres. This overlooks, however, such
facts as the source of the Doe fortune which was partly rooted in commerce, and the
area, for the Doe home was located in a region of concentrated manufacturing.
Moreover, Doe's closest associate on the court at that time was William Ladd. The
year after Brown, Ladd wrote an opinion showing that New Hampshire judges were
worried by Rylands implications that the "large class of our people engaged in various
manufacturing operations, who use water-power to propel their machinery, and for that
purpose maintain reservoirs," would be held to the rule that, "in case of the breaking
away of such reservoirs, there is no question of care or negligence to be tried, but
that he who has thus accumulated water in a 'non-natural' state on his own premises
is liable, at all events as matters of law, in case it escapes, for the damage caused
by it." Garland v. Towne, supra note 60, at 57.
79. In one instance Doe did rely upon social arguments to buttress the legal
principle. Thus when examining the old English rules of absolute liability, he said:
"They were certainly introduced in Engla.d at an immature stage of English jurisprudence, and an undeveloped state of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce,
when the nation had not settled down to those modem, progressive, industrial pursuits
which the spirit of the common law, adapted to all conditions of society, encourages
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Blackburn would have set up a special rule, an exception to the
general principle of tort liability. Judge Doe detested special rules,
and finding no need for introducing one to cover the situations in
either Brown v. Collins or in Rylands v. Fletcher,rejected Blackburn's
exception to the principle that, if an accident producing damage results from a lawful act, fault must be proven before liability will be
imposed.
The general common-law rule of tort liability (designed to be
applied with as few exceptions as possible) which Judge Doe established for New Hampshire was that, an inevitable accident, "without
actual fault in either party, is not a cause of action." 80 The question
to which Doe did not give a detailed answer in Brown v. Collins was,
what constitutes "fault?" He got his chance to do so exactly a year
later in the Androscoggin River Case."' The plaintiff was a property
owner whose lands lay along a river. The defendants were incorporated for the purpose of regulating water levels for commercial needs;
most particularly for lumbermen running logs downstream. The
plaintiff sought damages for injury to his land resulting from flowing
caused when the defendants released water from their upstream
dams. There was no issue of reasonable necessity, for the defendants
had been authorized, by statute, to do what they did, and the
plaintiff conceded that they had acted lawfully. Moreover, the plaintiff agreed that the defendants had "used and managed said water
in a prudent manner ... and in the use thereof were careful to do
as little damage as possible. . ... 82
Doe held there could be no recovery. He approached the problem
as though it were similar to the Rylands situation, viewing the plaintiff
and the defendants as owners of adjacent property. Doe ruled there
was no cause of action, for a right of ownership cannot be invaded
by the reasonable use of neighboring land.m Fault then cannot be
established by use, but by the manner of use; reasonable use is an
answer to the charge of fault. In Androscoggin the defendants were
not liable for the use which they made of the water-that is, for
there were logs to
holding it back at one time and releasing it when
4
float-since they had always used it reasonably.8
and defends. They were introduced when the development of many of the rational
rules now universally recognized as principles of the common law had not been
demanded by the growth of intelligence, trade, and productive enterprise, when the
common law had not been set forth in the precedents, as a coherent and logical system
on many subjects other than the tenures of real estate." Brown v. Collins, supra
note 9, at 450, 16 Am. Rep. at 381.
80. Lyons v. Childs, 61 N.H. 72, 74 (1881).
81. Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545 (1874).
82. Id. at 547 (reporter's note).
83. Id. at 552.
84. Id. at 558.
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As to what constitutes reasonable use as a matter of law, Doe would
not say. It is not, he thought, necessary "to compose a catalogue of
all the possible elements of reasonableness and unreasonableness."85
Properly they are questions of fact. He was willing to let the jury
weigh subjective factors. Reasonable care was to be considered. A
landowner along a river who, when using his property, makes a cut
to divert the flow of water "without taking precautions necessary to
prevent the natural, apparent, and expected consequences" of flooding
his neighbor's farm, would be liable "because such a cut, causing
such an injury, would have been unreasonable use of his own land."86
And, as Doe said in another case, "Reasonable care often depends
upon actual knowledge, or reasonable and rightful expectation." 87
A reasonably careful person, introducing dangers, in the use of force or
the possession of destructive materials, on highways or elsewhere, with
full knowledge of probable consequences, adopts the measures known by
him to be necessary to avoid an unreasonable exposure of others to risks
that are less apparent to them than to him. His knowledge of their uninstructed and unskillful condition may be a material element of his duty.88

Thus, in Doe's theory of torts, not only was the defendant's "full
knowledge of probable consequences" an element to be considered
when determining due care, but so was his "knowledge" of any
peculiar inability under which the public in general might labor
when confronted by the danger which he has created. Doe was
careful to point out, however, that "reasonable expectation of
damage," objective or subjective, was but one criterion for determining reasonable care. "Light, air, water, and many natural and
artificial agencies, may render a reasonable use of one's own [property]
detrimental to others; and many considerations, besides reasonable
expectation of damage, may enter into the broad question of reasonable use."8
This is not to say that Doe grounded fault in personal morality.
The standard by which he judged the subjective aspect of a man's
act was external, not internal. He never received an opportunity to
express himself on this point, 90 but there is every reason to believe
he agreed with Holmes. 91
One explanation as to why Judge Doe never discussed the standard
of judgment may have been that it did not strike him as especially
85. Id. at 551.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 557.
Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 190 (1890).
Id. at 191.
Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., supra note 81, at 551.
He did concur in Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 Ad. 902 (1891).

91. HoLmFs,

THE COMMON LAw 110

(1881).
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important. This could be a result of his approach to the problem of
liability. He did not look at the law of torts in terms of wrongs,
but in terms of rights. Consider for example his opinion in the
Androscoggin River Case. He did not speak of the flowing as a
wrong committed by the defendant. Rather he began by establishing
the plaintiff's right, as an owner of real estate, not to be injured by a
neighbor making unreasonable use of his land. This, Doe said, is one
of the proprietary rights of which his general and comprehensive right
of property is composed. 2 A violation of it can be grounds for an
action in tort. Putting it another way, he explained why the careful
and skillful use of fire on one's own land, for a reasonably necessary
commercial or domestic purpose, would not form a basis for liability
if that fire spread to an adjacent estate. It would not be actionable
because such a reasonable use of one's 93own property, without fault,
"is not an invasion of another's right."
It might be argued that the emphasis on "right" rather than "wrong"
is inconsistent with Judge Doe's general objectives of "reasonableness"
and "flexibility," since "right" is a more positive concept requiring
greater precision in treatment and should not fluctuate in consequences with changes in fact situations. But in Doe's scheme of the
legal order, the notion of "right" no more called for the cataloging
of elements or the accumulating of definitions than did "wrong." Most
rights in society, he believed, whether property rights or personal
rights, "are not absolute, but relative."- The establishment of a
"right" could be as much a question of fact as the finding of a
"wrong."
One result of approaching the problem of liability in terms of
"right" rather than wrong, was that Doe was led at times to think
of the defendant as assuming the risk for violating the plaintiff's
right. "Taking the risk," Holmes observed in 1899, was "an expression
which we never heard used as it now is until within a very few
years."9 5 Perhaps so, but Doe had used the term in the sense which
Holmes understood it as early as 1860 when he said that, if a servant
"takes the risks of known defects of machinery, it would seem that he
also assumes, to some extent, the risks of known incompetency and
insuflficiency of fellow-servants."6 This is the conventional meaning of
the assumption-of-risk doctrine-as an element in the fellow-servant
92. Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., supra note 81, at 552.
93. Id. at 556. Likewise, in the Mink Case he approached the question of reasonable
necessity in terms of "the defendant's right." Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 403
(1873).
94. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448, 16 Am. Rep. 372, 375 (1873).
95. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HAnv. L. RFv. 443, 455 (1899);
HoLm-s, CoLLEcTED LE-GAL FAPEns 210, 230 (1920).
96. Fifield v. Northern R.R., 42 N.H. 225, 240 (1860).
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rule; the harshness of which Doe tried to mitigate during his last years
on the bench by making the test entirely subjective, holding that an
employee assumes only the risks which are "apparent to his observation," and not those which, "on account of his want of experience, he
could not reasonably be expected to apprehend."97 Today in New
Hampshire, the assumption-of-risk doctrine is confined to masterservant relationships, 98 but in his time, like Blackburn before him,9'
Doe believed that assumption-of-risk might be used as a general
defense in other types of tort actions. For example, he suggested,
just as Blackburn had, that a person who locates along a highway
may be held to the risks of inevitable accident incident to the
exercise of the public's right to use that highway in a reasonable
manner.'00 This is the conventional assumption-of-risk doctrine.
What seems significant is that Doe turned the concept of assumption
of risk around. He employed it not only as a defense against liability,
but also as a test for liability. And he did so when approaching the
issue of liability in terms of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's
right. Thus, in the passage from Brown v. Collins which was cited as
summarizing his theory of liability for accidents,'"' Judge Doe said
that a defendant, who assumes he has a right to act as he does, undertakes the risk of maintaining the right which he asserts and the
responsibility for the natural consequences of his voluntary actions.
It has been suggested that in an earlier case, Underhill v. Manchester,102 Judge Doe perhaps anticipated this doctrine-"the risk theory
of tort liability."10 3 Underhill kept a saloon in the city of Manchester,
using the front room to sell "spirituous liquors" and the rear for
gambling. As Doe laconically described the events, "A bank bill was
offered to be passed at a gambling table in the back room, the bill
was alleged to be counterfeit, a dispute arose, the dispute grew into
an assault, the assault into a riot, in which his property in the saloon
was destroyed."'04 Both the sale of spirituous liquors and public
wagering were illegal, yet Underhill had the gall to sue the city under
the "rioters' statute," which made the city liable for destruction of
property by mobs. The statute barred recovery by one whose illegal
or improper conduct caused the riot, and the issue was whether the
plaintiff's action had caused the riot which destroyed his property.
Judge Doe held that they had; that a saloon keeper could not recover
97. Demers v. Glen Mfg. Co., 67 N.H. 404, 406 (1892).
98. Dowse v. Maine Cent. R.R., 91 N.H. 419, 421, 20 A.2d 629, 631 (1941).
99. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
100. Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., supra note 81, at 558.
101. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
102. 45 N.H. 214 (1864).
103. Note, 63 HAzv. L. REv. 513, 520 (1950).
104. Underhill v. Manchester, supra note 102, at 216.
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where the riot grew out of a gambling dispute between two of his
patrons. By way of dictum, Doe went on to consider whether Underbill could have been held liable at common law to innocent third
parties whose property had been damaged by the rioters. It was here
that he first expressed the risk theory of liability. Doe began by admitting that saloon keepers usually are not considered liable for
damage done to the property of others by men whom they have made
drunk. He also conceded that such damage is remote and that it would
be difficult to set a limit on the consequences which an ordinary person
is likely to anticipate. But these difficulties, within Doe's scheme of
the legal order, are properly difficulties of fact and not difficulties
of law and should not be used by a court as an excuse for barring a
just claim.
Notwithstanding the dearth of exact precedent which there has been so
frequent opportunity to establish, it might not be futile to enquire why
one . . . should not be liable for damage done by men whom he has drawn
together in the same place, and aided in making irrational, uncontrollable,
and dangerous . . . [and] why the keeper of a drinking and gambling
house should not be regarded as one who negligently sets mechanical forces
in operation beyond his power to stop or safely direct, or carelessly puts

destructive implements or materials in situations where they are likely to
produce mischief .... 105

This dictum, written the year before Blackburn handed down Rylands,
contains elements which at first glance seem to anticipate the extrahazardous activity doctrine as much as the risk theory of liability. The
teetotaling Doe, however, would probably have drawn a distinction
on the grounds that the excessive sale of spirits is not a reasonably
necessary occupation and that an illicit saloon keeper may well be
guilty of fault by the very nature of his enterprise. "By openly keeping a saloon for such purposes, he invited such company as usually
frequent such places, solicited them to gamble, and offered them a
stimulus highly promotive of brawls, affrays, riots and all other
crimes."106 The owner of such a place assumes the risk and should be
held to abide the consequences.
One might argue that Doe was not really anticipating the assumption-of-risk theory of liability. Rather he was formulating an assumption-of-risk theory of negligence; that he was defining culpability by
saying fault is in the assumption of risk. The unreasonable assumption
defines the fault which created the liability. This, however, was not
what Doe had in mind. He made it quite clear that a person who
is without fault might still be liable for merely asserting and acting
105. Id. at 218.
106. I& at 216.
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upon a right, for he has "assumed the risk of maintaining the right
which he has asserted, and the
responsibility of the natural conse10 7
quences of his voluntary act."
In Brown v. Collins Doe mentioned four possible grounds for tort
liability: damage caused by (1) fault on the part of the actor; or by
(2) his voluntary and intended act; or by (3) an act which he knew,
or ought to have known, to be unlawful; or by (4) an act of which he
knew, or ought to have known, the damage would be a necessary,
probable, or natural consequence. 10 8 In other words, a person who
acts lawfully and without either fault, or an intent to inflict injury,
may be liable for damage which is a necessary, probable, or natural
consequence of his act. This is because he knew, or ought to have
known, he was assuming a risk that injury could result.
Again the question arises, how does this differ from the Rylands
doctrine? The answer is that liability is based on a general principle
of reasonable conduct, and not on technical exceptions which depend
on the definitions of "extra-hazardous nature" and "non-natural use."
Moreover, knowledge of the unreasonableness of the risk takes the
happening out of the category of "accident" which requires fault for

liability.
Unfortunately Judge Doe never received an opportunity to explore
this theory of liability to its ultimate conclusion. The chief question
left unresolved was how far liability for an assumption of risk would
carry. Did it extend, for example, to the stranger or even the trespasser whose presence within the area of danger is unsuspected?
Doe answered this partly by his qualification of actual or constructive
knowledge which the actor must have of the necessary, probable,
or natural consequences of his act. This Doe would undoubtedly
have left to be determined on the general grounds of reasonableness
as a question of fact for the jury.10 9
107. Brown v. Collins, supra note 94, at 448, 16 Am. Rep. at 375.
108. Ibid. See text accompanying note 52 upra. When Doe mentions liability for
an intended injury he does not qualify it with privilege. Yet it seems unlikely that he
thought an intended injury inflicted within the reasonable bounds of a legal justification
is actionable.
109. Judge Doe's emphasis upon "fact" in tort liability was questioned by the lawschool trained generation which succeeded him. When the issue of scope finally arose
in a negligence matter, Judge Peaslee answered that as a matter of law the plaintiff
had to prove that the defendant's act or omission constituted a breach of duty owed
to him. This, he said, is "a rule of relation" and thus an unsuspected trespasser is
barred from recovery. Garland v. Boston & Maine R.R., 76 N.H. 556, 563 (1915).
Since fault was an issue, this was perhaps a case in which Doe would not have the
assumption-of-risk doctrine of liability. But the concept of "duty owed" swallowed up
the concept of "risk taken" for now negligence could be found in the taking of the
risk in violation of the duty. This robbed the assumption-of-risk theory of liability of
much significance. Garland is an overlooked predecessor of PaIsgraf. In that case
Cardozo said: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
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Perhaps Doe was not too serious about the risk doctrine of tort
liability. Had he been interested, he undoubtedly could have found
a case with which to develop it further. Yet he at no time indicated
an intention to abandon it, and it must still be accepted as part of
his theory of torts. With this in mind, Judge Doe's theory of torts
may be summarized as follows: A person will be liable for damage
resulting from an accident for which he is at fault" 0 (the test for
which is whether he acted "reasonably""' or as a man of "average
prudence"&-2 );for damage resulting from his intention to inflict an
injury not justified or privileged at law; for damage resulting from
unlawful actions; and for damage resulting from the assumption of an
unreasonable risk.
As previously suggested, Holmes began his search for a theory of
torts at about the same time as Doe. He ended, however, with a
radically different concept. He divided the law of torts into three
sections. At either end he placed the rules "determined by policy
without reference of any kind to morality"-at one, harms intentionally inflicted; at the other, acts for which, "although his conduct
has been prudent and beneficial to the community," the actor must
answer at his peril when they result in damage." 3 In the vast center
section, Holmes placed acts for which liability attaches when, as
Howe says, "the defendant's conduct did not satisfy the objective
standard established by current morality."" 4 Holmes determined
this standard by weighting the risk, not in terms of reasonableness
as Doe would have done, but in terms of danger; that is, "by considering the degree of danger attending the act or conduct under the
known circumstances.""15 Once experience showed that a given act
had the tendency to cause harm under given circumstances, Holmes
would turn the standard from a question of fact into a concrete
rule of law designed to govern specific cases. Thus Holmes envisioned each section of his tripartite division of tort law containing
rules which would lend certainty and predictability to the issue of
liability.
The question is, how did these two men, coming as they did from
and risk imports relations; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
110. "[Aln accident, without fault in either party, is not a cause of action." Lyons
v. Child, 61 N.H. 72, 74 (1881).
111. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
112. See opinion by Parsons, J.,in which Doe concurred, Davis v. Boston & Maine
R.R., 68 N.H. 247, 44 AUt. 388 (1895).
113. HoL.ms, ov. cit. supra note 91, at 161.
114. HowF, OLxxvERWmWnu_ HoLr n: Tim PRovING YE"s 189 (1963).
115. HoLMEs, op. cit. supra note 91, at 162. A year before Doe died, and thirteen
years after the publication of The Common Law, Holmes summarized his theory in
Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894).
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roughly the same strata of the same society, and working with the
same tools, evolve such completely different theories. Many answers
may be offered. For one thing, Holmes was a writer while Doe
was a judge. As a writer Holmes could range far afield and consider
problems and consequences which would be beyond the scope of
Doe's area of investigation, limited as he was by the fact patterns
with which he had to deal. On the other hand, Holmes as a writer
had to come to terms with established precedents such as the Rylands
doctrine and adjust his theory to accommodate them. Doe as a
judge, and especially as a judge who accorded little weight to precedent, could ignore rules which did not accommodate themselves to
his way of thinking. A more basic and meaningful explanation, however, is that the two men began their search for a theory of torts with
totally opposite ends in mind. The key to Holmes's effort, Mark
DeWolfe Howe points out, "was Holmes's desire for certainty ip
law."" 6 The key to Doe's search, on the other hand, was Doe's
desire to establish a few basic principles which would end the need
for special rules and exceptions designed to govern almost every
conceivable fact situation. Holmes sought to create a philosophical
order which would encourage the formulation of concrete rules (and
exceptions to those rules) drawn from the experience of jury verdicts,
and which would, in time, reduce the jury's lawmaking role and
replace capriciousness with stability." 7 Doe sought to increase the
jury's role by decreasing the lawmaking function of the court, in order
to bring flexibility, justice, and reasonableness to the law of tort

liability.
That divergent tort theories can lead to discordant results is seen
by the different solutions offered by Holmes and Doe to one of the
most common liability problems of their day-accidents at railway
crossings. Both were asked to determine the standard of due care
which must be exercised by a person seeking damages for injury
sustained when struck by a train while driving over railroad tracks at
a public junction. Holmes's case was Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman." 8 Doe's was Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R.1 9
In Goodman the deceased had been traveling in a motor truck
at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, but had slowed to half
the speed about forty feet from the crossing. Goodman's view of
the track was obstructed by a section house until he was twenty
or so feet from the rails. It was daylight and Goodman was familiar
116. Howz op. cit. supra note 114, at 197. But see, Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,
31 U. Cm. L. Rv. 213, 221-22 (1964).
117. Ibid.
118. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
119. 66 N.H. 185 (1890).
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with the location. The train which killed him was traveling at sixty
miles an hour and sounded no warning of its approach. It is
probable he could not see it until within eleven and one-half feet of
the danger point. Even then, at the rate he was traveling, about seven
to eight feet per second, this gave him only one and one-half seconds
12
to avoid impact. He had, counsel argued, "been led into a trap."

In Huntress the plaintiff's wife was traveling in a carriage on a
public highway. There was no gate or flagman, but in obedience to
the only applicable statute, the railroad had erected the familiar
"warning signs." The track was straight for a mile or more in the
direction from which the train was coming, and there was an unobstructed view "for a long distance." It was a May afternoon, which
in New Hampshire meant there was probably plenty of light. At
the whistling-post the signal required by law was given, and the bell
was rung constantly from post to crossing. Yet, despite these precautions and the favorable conditions, the plaintiffs wife121attempted
to cross in front of the train. She was struck and killed.
The two cases can be distinguished on their facts. But since Justice
Holmes used Goodman as a platform for laying down a broad principle
of law not limited to the circumstances, the differences between
them are inconsequential.
The defendant-railroads in both actions pleaded contributory negligence by the deceased. A traveler is barred from recovery, they
urged in Goodman, if his view is obscured and he fails to stop,122
"The deceased could have seen the train had she looked," they
argued in Huntress. "If she saw it she could have avoided collision
by stopping her horse." 1 3 Justice Holmes agreed, and decided as a
matter of law that Goodman had been contributorily negligent.
When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place
where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the
track. He knows that he must stop for the train, not the train stop for
him. In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure
otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out
of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more
than to stop and look. It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the
train or any signal and takes no further precautions he does so at his own
risk. If at the last moment Goodman found himself in an emergency it
was his own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a
stop. It is true .

.

. that the question of due care very generally is left to

the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the
standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts. 124
120. Baltimore &Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, supra note 118, at 68.
121. Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R., supra note 119, at 187.

122. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, supra note 118, at 67.
123. Brief for Defendant, Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R., supra note 119.

124. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, supra note 118, at 69-70.
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On reading these words, Sir Frederick Pollock expressed surprise

how anyone could disagree with them.'2

Doe would have been

surprised how anyone could have written them.

Perhaps Doe was not as confident as Holmes that "the standard
is clear." More likely he was not so concerned with standards. To

lay down a legal rule in effect freezing conduct, he thought, left
many factual issues unresolved.

He refused to agree with the

Supreme Court of the United States that, as a matter of law, people
who dart in the path of trains they are able to see, are conducting

experiments for which railroads cannot be made to pay.126 A man,
Doe pointed out, might pass in front of a moving train and not be
at fault.
In the full possession and vigorous use of his faculties, without even a
momentary absence or preoccupation of mind, with his intelligence alert
and diligently applied to the question of waiting for the train to pass, he
might act upon an error of judgment in regard the speed of the train and
the time that would elapse before its arrival. There is reason to believe a
mistake on this point is the cause of many accidents. A large portion of
the community have such knowledge of the danger of crossing a street in
front of a horse team moving at a moderate gait as is necessary in determining whether safety requires them to wait for the team to pass. But high
rates of speed create a degree of danger that is not generally realized
by those who have no special means of information on the subject. Whether
a train is going twenty miles an hour or forty, is a question on which the
opinion of but few observers would be considered valuable by a railway
127
expert.

It is, therefore, always a question of fact whether the particular
defendant, against whom contributory negligence is alleged, could
accurately estimate the danger into which he placed himself by
measuring speed in terms of time, distance, and visible rapid motion.

Less of a legal strategist than Holmes, but more of a legal tactician,
Doe gave careful thought to the implications of placing upon the

plaintiff the burden of proving the deceased's exercise of due care
where there is no direct evidence aside from the fact the deceased

voluntarily entered the area of danger and was struck by the
defendant's train.
A person of ordinary prudence, exercising the caution and vigilance which
the law has adopted as the test of duty, might make an extremely hazardous
attempt to cross a railroad in front of a train. From the mere fact of
great danger, it does not necessarily follow that he exposed himself recklessly
and consciously. When there is no evidence of insanity, intoxication, or
suicidal purpose, and no evidence on the question of his care, except the
125. Pollock, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HAuiv. L. REv. 693, 695 (1931).
126. Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697, 702 (1877).
127. Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R., supra note 119, at 190.
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instinct provided for the preservation of animal life, it may be inferred from
this circumstantial proof that, for some reason consistent with ordinary
attempt to cross was due to
care and freedom from fault on his part,12his
8
his inadequate understanding of the risk.

This was the question of fact. Did this deceased person, judged by
the ability which the prudent man has of measuring speed in terms
of time and distance, understand the danger and knowingly assume

the risk?
Mr. Holmes would have objected to Doe's emphasis on under-

standing the risk; a conjecture both unscientific and inexact. It was
precisely to avoid law by supposition that he urged courts to formu-

late external standards of conduct. These standards, reflecting the
morality of the community, were to be gathered from experience. But

how, Doe might have asked, are they to be gathered? "A judge who
has long sat at nisi prius," Holmes said, "ought gradually to acquire a
fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense
of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average

jury."t1 Doe disagreed. He thought judges, after a period at the
bar and on the bench, are inwardly turned towards rules, technicalities, and fine distinctions, and are apt to lose sight of "the common
sense of the community." Suffering "the mental fetters of habitual
nomenclature & vocabulary," 3" they are more likely to follow legal

pedantisms than social experience, and thus subvert the reason of law

by a "process of fossilization." 131 Had he been asked, Doe might

well have said this was what had happened to Holmes in the Goodman
decision. Holmes had been too intent on his pet legal theories and
had lost sight of the reason of the law. Surely the opinion has been
criticized;132 and by Holmes's admirers, too.as Holmes had sought
a standard drawn from experience, but as Judge Cuthbert Pound
remarked, he had come up with "a standard not in accord with the

present conduct of the prudent man." 134
128. ibid.

129. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 91, at 124.
130. Draft Opinion, p. 50, File 580, Doe Papers, New Hampshire Supreme Court
Vault
131. "One of the disturbing & obstructive elements in the formation of sound
opinions is the influence of usage & habits of thought, & associations of ideas originating
therein & based thereon. This influence, varying in degree in different cases &
different persons, has, on some subjects, in some ages, in some persons of powerful
intellect & faultless moral constitution, created a state of mind equivalent to an
invincible bigotry in which the reasoning powers were practically suspended, & no
evidence & no argument had any force. The law has not been wholly exempt from a
danger of the process of fossilization. No man can be sure that he enjoys absolute
mental freedom." Id. at 48.
132. See Note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 926 (1930).
133. LEmaNE, THE Mn AN FArn OF JUSTICE HoLNES 205-08 (1943).
134. Pound, Book Review, 44 HAv.L. R1v. 1303, 1304 (1931).
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If Doe believed that Holmes's method of finding "the common
sense of the community was bound to fail, what alternative did he
offer? The answer lay in the very principle which Holmes rejected
as basically fallacious and dangerously unsound-that most tort issues
are questions of fact for the jury. It was this principle, broadly
applied-in an unprecedented manner, which permitted Judge Doe to
place in practice his jurisprudential norm that law must reflect the
conditions and attitudes of contemporary society.135 What better way
is there to seek the standards of the community than by asking the
jury-the theoretical cross-section of society? But, as previously noted,
Holmes felt the law of torts needs greater predictability and he
would have diminished the role of the jury.136 Doe felt it needs fewer
rules and would have diminished the role of the court. 37 Holmes
said that the sphere in which a judge is able to rule without taking
the opinion of a jury "should be continually growing." 138 Doe said
that if judges would accord facts a more prominent place in relation
to law, "the profession would be relieved and justice promoted."3 9
Holmes thought that judges who left standards of conduct as ques140
tions of fact for the jury were surrendering a judicial function.

Doe thought there were few tort issues which could be treated as
pure matters of law.' 4 '
In Goodman Holmes, having held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law, never took up the issue whether the defendant-railroad, which had not sounded a warning as it approached
the crossing, was guilty of fault. In Huntress Doe had to consider the
issue of the defendant's culpability. There the engineer and other
employees had not been at fault. Everything required by statute had
been done, and in addition the bell had been rung constantly from
the whistling-post to the point of impact. Doe did not waste time on
fine points which seem to fascinate some other judges, such as whether
the statutory standard represents only the minimum degree of care
135. Note, supra note 103, at 518-19.
136. HowE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 197.
137. For a discussion of Doe's tort cases in relation to his ideas about questions of
fact see, Reid, A Peculiar Mode of Expression: Judge Doe's Use of the Distinction
Between Law and Fact, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 427, 440-42.
138. HOLmES, op. cit. supra note 91, at 124.
139. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 526 (1869).
140. HoLmrs, op. cit. supra note 91, at 126. See also Holmes, supra note 95, at
467; HoLmxs, op. cit. supra note 95, at 234.
141. See Squires v. Young, 58 N.H. 192 (1877). A statute permitted spouse to sue
for loss of support of husband caused by his intoxication from liquor unlawfully sold.
Here husband has died and plaintiff brings action against seller. Doe said: "It cannot
be held, as a matter of law, that the frequent intoxication of the plaintiff's husband
during the last five years of his life could not have caused his death. And the court
cannot adjudge habitual drunkenness to be a cause of death too remote for legal
cognizance." Id. at 193.
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or whether statutory duties can fall below the common law requirements. This, he thought, was for the jury to decide. There was a
factual issue present, and Doe made it as wide as all outdoors:
Railway managers may be presumed to have special knowledge of the
dangers of their business, and to be aware of the constant peril arising
at level crossings from the fact that intelligent and careful people frequently overestimate the safety of attempting to cross in front of trains
moving at high speed. The danger thus caused was probably not foreseen
when the defendants' road was built. The speed required by public convenience on railways is found to be inconsistent with the public safety at
level crossings where there are no gates or watchmen. The expense of
watchmen, or gates and watchmen, at all such crossings, would increase the
cost of transportation . .

. But the practical difficulties resulting from

the conflict of public interests do not change the legal principles applicable
to this case, or affect the plaintiff's cause of action. The knowledge which
the defendants may be presumed to have of the fact that persons of
ordinary prudence frequently go upon level crossings in front of moving
trains, when they would wait for the trains to pass if they had been long
employed as railroad managers or trainmen, is a knowledge of a danger
caused by high speed, and common misapprehensions and miscalculations.
The defendants, presumably aware of this customary danger and its cause,
are bound to act upon their superior knowledge, and to take such precauordinary prudence would take, under the circumstances, in
tions as men of
142
their situation.

All this is rather speculative and gives the jury a vast area in which
to let its imagination range, especially since it is allowed to impute
"superior knowledge" to the railroad on conjectures such as whether
the average laymen can judge speed. Without the least apology or
reservations, Doe was permitting the triers of fact to apply a sub-

jective test to this defendant within the external standards of what
the prudent expert, possessing "superior knowledge," would have done.
Moreover, by framing the issue in terms of preference between safe
crossings and cheap transportation, Chief Justice Doe was asking

the jury to set the public policy of the law. This shows how far
he had departed from Holmes's theory of the jury's function in tort

activities. To Holmes the only question with which the jury should
concern itself is the conduct of the parties. The standards to be

applied to that conduct are for the court to establish.143 In Huntress,

Doe took a stand for the exact opposite. It is, he insisted,
a question of fact whether a person of ordinary prudence, operating the
defendants' road with their knowledge of the dangers of level crossings,
would guard against accidents by stationing flagmen there, or slackening
the speed of the trains. If wrong is done in the decision of questions of fact,
142. Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 191 (1890).
143. HOLM-S, THE COMMON LAw 124 (1881).
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it cannot be legally prevented or rectified by a judicial alteration of the

law. 144

In 1894, twenty-three years after he had doubted whether torts
was "a proper subject for a book," 145 Holmes announced that, "The
law of torts as now administered has worked itself into substantial
agreement with a general theory." 146 The fact that he and Doe disagreed on fundamental issues did not trouble him. Holmes believed
Doe "second rate" and probably gave his theory little thought.147 John
Henry Wigmore, who held Doe in the highest regard, 148 immediately
challenged Holmes's statement, asserting there were many funda49
mental issues still to be resolved. !But
on the whole, he accepted
Holmes's tripartite division of torf liability, and probably would have
agreed with Howe's recent claim that Holmes "had provided a structure of theory which shaped the common law of torts for many
generations." 5 0
"Structure" is the key word here. Holmes was interested in the
structure, in the order, in the theory of the common law. Charles
Doe was less interested in structure than in function. But it is not
enough to say that this led him to stress the jury as the instrumentality
for settling tort issues. The role of the jury is only the symbol of the
sunderance between Doe and Holmes. The root goes deeper and is
buried in their definitions of law. "The life of law has not been
logic," goes Holmes's most famous saying, "it has been experience." 151
Not so, Doe thought. "Reason is the life of law." 152 By "reason" Doe
did not mean the syllogistic logic which Justice Holmes and the
Realist School of jurisprudence would associate with his generation
of judges in order to disparage them. Neither Doe nor most of his
contemporaries used this approach to the solution of legal problems.
Rather, by "reason" Doe meant a process of decision making which
reconciled law with experience, not through the formulation of rules,
but through the application of felt and articulated "justice" discoverable in the norms and practices of changing society.15'
144. Huntress v. Boston & Maine R.R. supra note 119, at 191-92.
145. See text accompanying note 4 supra.

146. Holmes, supra note 115.
147. Letter From 0. W. Holmes to J. H. Wigmore, Jan. 14, 1910, quoted in HowE,

op. cit. supra note 114, at 84. It is known that Holmes read Brown v. Collins. Id. at
85 n.55.
148. Pike, President's Address-Memories of Judge Doe, 3 N.H. BAR Ass'N PNoc.
463 (1916).
149. Wigmore, The Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 H.nv. L. REv. 200 (1894).

150. Hown, op. cit. supra note 114, at 194.
151. HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
152. Kendall v. Brownson, supranote 19, at 205 (dissenting opinion).

153. This is why, as noted earlier, Doe said: "And it is of some importance that the
ancient uniformity, consistency and symmetry of the law, as a system of general prin-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

Not only did Doe think "justice" a definable and practical standard
by which a judge could administer every-day law,'- 4 but so was
"reason." As he said of New Hampshire jurisprudence: "The doctrine
of reasonable necessity, reasonable care, and reasonable use prevail
5
in this state in a liberal form, on a broad basis of general principle."1
It was on this "general principle" that Doe built the law of torts.
Once he had placed a wrong within one of the four parts to his theory
of liability, Doe could resolve most issues by the test of "reasonableness." Thus the issue whether the defendant had acted lawfully was
resolved by the question of fact-did he act from reasonable necessity.156 The issue of fault in cases of inevitable accident could
sometimes be resolved by asking if the defendant had acted reasonably. And the issue of assumption of risk was resolved by the question
whether the defendant had been reasonable in assuming the risk
knowing the consequences which might result from his act. Indeed,
it may be said that in one decision judge Doe went all the way and
defined the tort in terms of "unreasonableness" alone. This occurred
in an action on the case in which the plaintiff sued a railroad for rate
discrimination. Ignoring all pertinent statutes, Doe pointedly based
liability on common law principles. The important question, he held,
was not discrimination or inequality of service, it was unreasonableness.
Although reasonableness of service or price may require a reasonable discrimination, it does not tolerate an unreasonable one; and the law does not
require a court or jury to waste time in a useless investigation of the question whether a proved injurious unreasonableness of service or price was in
its intrinsic or in its discriminating quality. The main queston is, not
whether the unreasonableness was in this or in that, but whether there
was unreasonableness, and whether it was injurious to the plaintiff.157

Again we find Doe framing a question of fact in terms which permit
the jury to set public policy.
"Reasonableness," Doe thought, could be used to determine the
presence of, and the weight to be accorded to, each element at issue
in a tort litigation. His handling of the right to self defense serves
as an illustration. "The chronological part of the doctrine of defence,
like the rest of it," he wrote in the Mink Case, "is a matter of reasonciples, should not be unnecessarily impaired by the introduction or extension of
fragmentary rules or disorganizing exceptions, not founded in the reason of the law."
Id. at 205.
154. Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUm.

L. REv. 60,63 (1963).
155. Haley v. Colcord, 59 N.H. 7, 8 (1879).
156. Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144 (1880); Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398 (1873)
(the Mink Case).

157. McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester R.R., 52 N.H. 430, 452 (1873).
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ableness; and reasonableness depends upon circumstances." 158 This
means that no question raised by the doctrine of defense can be
settled as a matter of law. The place and probative value of each
action depends upon its reasonableness within the situation which the
evidence shows had existed at the time, and is a question of fact.
In defense, it may be reasonable that a man should strike quicker for
human life than for property; that he should strike quicker at a habitual
fighter, professional robber, or notorious assassin, from whom there would
be reason to expect sudden or extreme violence, than at a man previously
inoffensive, from whom there would be little reason to apprehend a serious
attack; that he would strike quicker at a strong man than a weak one;
that he should shoot a dog quicker than he should shoot a man; and that
he should shoot mischevious wild animals, which are the absolute property
of nobody, quicker than he should shoot a valuable domestic animal, the
property of his neighbor. The consequences of shooting, compared with
the consequences of not shooting; are material to be considered on the
question when he should shoot, as well as on the question whether shooting
1
is a defence of a reasonably necessary kind. 59

Here, in its clearest expression, can be seen why Judge Doe rejected
legal tests devised by courts to settle such issues as the right of self
defense. The concept of "reasonableness" would produce a truer
and more just result. "Imminence of danger," he concluded, "in this
broad and relative sense, creating
a reasonable necessity, was the
60
test of the defendant's right."
If Chief Justice Doe was carried to extremes, it was because he
wished to restore to the common law its "ancient uniformity, consistency and symmetry."' 61 He seized upon the doctrine of "reasonableness" as the unifying factor in the law of torts and at times lost
sight of the truth that law, to be useful, must be predictable as well
as just. Oliver Wendell Holmes never lost sight of this fact. He had,
as Professor Howe says, taken some pride in developing his theory of
torts because of its "uniformity." But he took even greater pride from
the conviction that "he had formulated a theory which might increase
the law's certainty and, therefore, the law's utility." 162 Above all
else Holmes objected to uncertainty, and it was on this point that
he offered his most basic challenge to Doe's philosophy of law. The
elements of most tort cases, Holmes wrote in that 1873 article which
Doe had read in proofs, "are permanent, and there is no reason why
a case should be decided one way to-day, and another way tomorrow.
To leave the question to the jury forever, is simply to leave the law
158. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 403 (1873).
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Supra note 153.
162. HowE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 199.
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uncertain."163

Doe did not question the utility of predictability. But he thought
other things more important. He had taken his stand a year earlier
when he wrote: "[T]he reason of the law has some regard for the
fundamental principles of justice as well as the demands of convenience."164 At the very moment when Holmes's article was being
published, Doe was handing down an opinion in which he offered
to Holmes a challenge of his own. He was considering whether the
concept of "reasonableness" is so vague that courts would find it
too difficult for practical application.
But such difficulty as there may be will arise from the breadth of the inquiry, the intricate nature of the matter to be investigated, the circumstantial
character of the evidence to be weighed, and the application of the legal
rule to the facts, and not from any want of clearness or certainty in the
general principle of the common law applicable to the subject. The difficulty
will not be in the common law, and cannot be justly overcome by altering
that law. The inquiry may sometimes be a broad one, but it will never
be broader than the justice of the case requires. A narrow view that would
be partial, cannot be taken; a narrow test of right and wrong that would
be grossly inequitable, cannot be adopted. If the doctrine of reasonableness
is not the doctrine of justice, it is for him who is dissatisfied with it to
show its injustice; if it is the doctrine of justice, it is for him to show the
grounds of his discontent.165

That was why Holmes wrote The Common Law. Doe thought

Holmes had failed to prove his case.
163. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. IEv. 652, 654-55 (1873).
164. Rixford v. Smith, 52 N.H. 355, 362 (1872).
165. McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester R.R., 52 N.H. 430, 453-54 (1873).

